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COMING CLEAN ABOUT “JUNK DNA”
Simon A. Cole ∗
It is a challenge to reply to a response when its very title pleads that we
put the issue of whether forensic DNA profiles contain predictive medical
information to rest. 1 I agree that the recent exchange between Professors
Joh, Kaye, and myself has probably beaten the “junk DNA” horse past the
point of expiration. One thing we all agree upon is that the potential privacy violations engendered by the storage of forensic DNA profiles in law
enforcement databases is a “distraction,” 2 as Professor Kaye puts it, from
the potential privacy issues posed by the storage of DNA samples in law enforcement and other government repositories.
Nonetheless, this exchange has not been a useless exercise. It began
when I discovered Professors Joh and Kaye’s contributions during my effort to better understand—and, therefore, more clearly convey in my own
writing—the state of scientific knowledge concerning the claim that the information held in law enforcement genetic databases is innocuous from a
privacy standpoint. Professor Joh asserted that the claim of innocuousness
was not true, 3 and Professor Kaye countered that Professor Joh’s claim was
flatly “false.” 4 Under such circumstances, I was at a loss as to what to tell
my own readers. Therefore, I traced back Professor Kaye’s key source, and
offered my own contribution to the debate, suggesting that both authors had
engaged in a certain degree of oversimplification. 5
Professor Kaye’s most recent contribution to this exchange brings further clarity to the issue. As his meticulous exposition of the precise mechanisms behind contemporary genetic screening demonstrates, when he and
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other proponents of forensic DNA databases say that forensic DNA profiles
have “no predictive value,” they actually mean that the profiles have predictive value, but that it is so small as to be practically useless. Likewise,
when Professor Joh and other opponents of such databases say that forensic
DNA profiles “contain predictive medical information,” 6 they also mean
that forensic STRs have only a very small amount of predictive value, at
least currently.
Professor Kaye’s response clarifies his declarations that law enforcement DNA profiles “have no meaning,” 7 “reveal nothing about propensities
for disease, behavioral traits, or the like,” 8 “can tell nothing about a person,” 9 and are “as meaningless as fingerprints,” 10 and explains how his
claims that “no forensic STR locus has been found to be predictive” 11 and
that “any claim that the DNA profiles currently used for identification constitute ‘predictive medical information’ is false,” 12 over the course of his
substantial body of work on the subject were shorthand for the more complex explanation contained in his response. His response makes clear that
forensic STRs contain predictive information, but that he cannot envision
feasible exploitations of this information given the current state of genetic
knowledge. 13
I do not have the genetic knowledge to challenge Professor Kaye’s
claims. 14 However, many readers may understand Professor Kaye’s body
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of work to be saying something more dismissive than what he describes in
his most recent response. Professor Kaye’s arguments may or may not convince other readers that his shorthand description of the admittedly very
complicated and technical state of scientific knowledge is appropriate. We
can perhaps all agree, however, that this admirably meticulous fuller explanation only benefits the public discourse.

Professor Kaye does, that any potential uses of genetic profiles must plausibly proceed from our current
understanding of genetics knowledge (or effectively doing the same by refusing to “speculate” about
such advances) is no less “science fiction” than assuming any particular scenario. Professor Kaye’s prediction that “the information coded in the databases is and will remain, with . . . limited exceptions . . .
useful only for identification,” Bury the Junk, supra note 1, at 71, is itself only one of many possible extrapolations of the future, a science fiction scenario. Professor Kaye’s insistence on labeling all extrapolations of the future state of genetic knowledge that cannot be supported by reference to current theory
as “science fiction” puts opponents of DNA databases in an unfair bind because it essentially demands
solid evidence of the state of future knowledge, something no one can produce.
Presumably, Professor Kaye would respond that his extrapolation of the future is more defensible
than others because it is “based on current knowledge and practice.” Id. It may be more defensible, but
that does not mean it is any more likely to be correct. Would the current capability of genetics have
been predictable from the state of knowledge and practice in 1960? If not, there is no reason to assume
that the capabilities of genetics in 2050—when the law enforcement DNA databases we are building today will likely still be in place and encompass a large portion of the population—must be wholly predictable from the current state of theory and knowledge.
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